Racially-Motivated Violence and Intimidation:  Inadequate State Enforcement and Federal Civil Rights Remedies by Padgett, Gregory L.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 75
Issue 1 Spring Article 3
Spring 1984
Racially-Motivated Violence and Intimidation:
Inadequate State Enforcement and Federal Civil
Rights Remedies
Gregory L. Padgett
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Gregory L. Padgett, Racially-Motivated Violence and Intimidation: Inadequate State Enforcement and Federal Civil Rights Remedies,
75 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 103 (1984)
0091-4169/84/7501-103
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAw & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 75, No. I







A rising wave of extremist group violence is sweeping the nation.
The number of violent attacks and threats directed at Blacks, Jews, and
other minorities has increased markedly during the last four years.'
Since mid-1979, hundreds of acts of racial and religious violence have
occurred in nearly all parts of the country. In November 1979, for ex-
ample, a group of thirty Ku Klux Klansmen and American Nazis fired
on demonstrators at an anti-Klan rally in Greensboro, North Carolina,
killing five communist demonstrators and injuring several others. 2 After
a cross-burning ceremony in Chattanooga, Tennessee, in April of 1980,
a group of Klansmen seriously injured five elderly black women in an
unprovoked shotgun attack.3 A former member of the Ku Klux Klan
and the American Nazi Party shot Vernon E. Jordan, then President of
the National Urban League, in Fort Wayne, Indiana, in May of 1980.
4
The same man later shot and killed two young black men while they
were jogging in a Salt Lake City park with two white women.5
1 See generally Increasing Violence Against Minorities.- Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of
the House Comm. on the Judiciay, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 124-25 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Increas-
ing Violence]; Polls relct increase in racist attitudes, POVERTY L. REP., Mar./Apr. 1982, at 15; J.
Turner, B. Stanton, M. Vahala & R. Williams, The Ku Klux Klan: A History of Racism and
Violence 48-59 (1981) (available from the Southern Poverty Law Center, Montgomery, Ala-
bama) [hereinafter cited as A History of Racism and Violence].
2 Chains, Grandf'ugy investigates Klan killings, IN THESE TIMES, Sept. 22-28, 1982, at 9,
col. 1.
3 Increasing Violence, supra note 1, at 26 (statement of Arthur Kinoy).
4 Telephone interview with Daniel Rinzel, Director of the Criminal Section, Civil Rights
Division of the United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 14, 1983) [here-
inafter cited as Telephone interview]; see infta note 163.
5 U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, PUB. No. 77, INTIMIDATION AND VIOLENCE: RA-
CIAL AND RELIGIOUS BIGOTRY IN AMERICA 2 (1983) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION
STATEMENT].
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Such occurrences are not isolated incidents, but reflect a paramili-
tary movement that is growing among these violent extremist groups.
In special camps near Birmingham, Alabama, Klan members undergo
paramilitary training, including instruction in automatic weapons fir-
ing, guerrilla war tactics, and survival techniques.6 Organizing them-
selves into private military forces, the trainees and their leaders talk of
killing blacks in a coming "race war, ' ' 7 which they believe is inevitable.8
Growing racial tensions in many areas have encouraged racist
organizations to increase their violent activities and recruiting efforts.9
There are presently 9,500 to 11,000 active members of the Ku Klux
Klan, up from 6,500 in 1975.10 The number of nonmember sympathiz-
ers who donate money to the Klan, attend rallies, or read Klan litera-
ture has grown to 100,00011-twice as many as three years ago. 12 A
significant degree of tacit public acceptance of racist and religious big-
otry continues to exist and further emboldens violent extremist groups. 13
Racial and religious violence1 4 persists in part because existing state
legislation and state court systems fail to adequately deter and punish
6 The KKK Goes Militaq, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 6, 1980, at 52. Other states where similar
Klan and Nazi paramilitary activities have been reported include Utah, Connecticut, Geor-
gia, North Carolina, Texas, Mississippi, Florida, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Tennessee, and Cali-
fornia. Id.; A History of Racism and Violence, supra note 1, at 54.
7 A History of Racism and Violence, supra note 1, at 54.
8 Id. Roger Handley, second-highest officer of the Louisiana-based Invisible Empire,
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, has said, "[w]e are going into revolution in this country...
[and] the Communists, through the Negroes, are going to bring it on. It will be a war be-
tween the races." Id.
9 See generaly A History of Racism and Violence, supra note 1, at 48-49. Many factors
have been cited as contributing to racial tensions, including recession, high unemployment,
increased foreign competition, an influx of legal and illegal aliens, and cutbacks in social
programs. Historically, such economic and social difficulties have often led to fear, isolation-
ism, and the search for scapegoats. At such times, racist extremist groups exploit legitimate
social and political issues, exaggerate the size and scope of existing problems, and exacerbate
tense local situations. Recruiting efforts are increased. See inkfa note 106; COMMISSION
STATEMENT, supra note 5, at 9-15.
10 Nesselson, Disrobing the Klan: Under the Hoods-Hoods!, 8 BARRISTER, Spring 1981, at 10,
10.
11 King, The Violent Rebirth ofthe Klan, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1980, § 6 (Magazine), at 150,
152; Increasing Violence, supra note 1, at 79 (statement of Irwin Suall).
12 Nesselson, supra note 10, at 10.
13 See infra text accompanying notes 103-09. Violent extremist group members tend to
interpret the current shift to a conservative political philosophy and federal retrenchment in
social spending and civil rights initiatives as giving them "license to express and act out their
racial and religious hostility." COMMISSION STATEMENT, supra note 5, at 13. It has been
suggested that " '[wihat the Klans and the neo-Nazis are doing now can be regarded as a kind
of testing, both of public opinion and of official response. Official responses which are toler-
ant, apathetic, or simply ineffective are likely to encourage more extremist action.'" Id. at 14
(quoting statement of Ted Gurr, Increasing Violence, supra note 1, at 8).
14 "Racial and religious violence" shall refer herein to violence directed against racial and
religious minorities.
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the perpetrators of these crimes. 15 Moreover, some state laws may prove
to be unenforceable because they interfere with the constitutional rights
of free speech and association guaranteed members of extremist
groups. 16 Well-established federal criminal and civil remedies for racial
and religious violence and intimidation exist.' 7 Neither the United
States Department of Justice nor the victims of racist violence, however,
have yet taken full advantage of the broadly written Reconstruction Era
civil rights statutes,' 8 which were enacted to deter and punish racial ter-
rorism whenever state criminal prosecutions fail to do so. 19
This Comment evaluates the inadequacies of state legislation and
criminal enforcement procedures intended to deter and punish racially
motivated violent crime, and advocates increased reliance on federal
criminal and civil remedies. The most effective approach to deter racial
violence and punish its perpetrators is a two-tiered system of enforce-
ment that combines federal prosecution and civil remedies with im-
provements in state legislation and enforcement systems.
II. THE FAILURE OF THE STATES TO ADEQUATELY DETER RACIAL
AND RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE
A. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS WITH STATE LEGISLATION
Many states have long had laws designed to deter or prevent vio-
lent extremist groups from harassing and intimidating others. Such
laws include anti-cross burning laws,20 anti-mask laws,21 and laws re-
stricting or prohibiting the formation of private paramilitary organiza-
15 See infa text accompanying notes 82-110.
16 See infia text accompanying notes 20-81.
17 See infa text accompanying notes 111-233.
18 The major civil rights statutes of the Reconstruction Era included the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, 1 ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866); the Enforcement Act of 1870, 2 ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140
(1870); and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 1 ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (popularly known as the
"Ku Klux Klan Act"). This Comment will focus primarily on the remedies available under
18 U.S.C. § 241 (1982), a modem criminal statute derived from § 6 of the Enforcement Act of
1870, and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) (1976), a civil statute derived from § 2 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1871.
19 See generally Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV.
1323 (1952).
20 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 876.17-18 (West 1976); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 10A
(1982); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:33-10, -11 (West 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-12.12 (1981);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-7-120 (Law. Co-op. 1976); VA. CODE § 18.2-423 (1982).
21 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-1 1-9(4) (1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2913 (1983); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:313 (West 1974); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.628 (Callaghan 1982); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.735 (West 1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-22-3 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-12.14 (1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1301 (West 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-7-110




tions.22 The recent rise in extremist group violence has led some
legislators to call for stricter enforcement of these existing laws.2 3 It has
also spurred efforts to enact new, and sometimes constitutionally sus-
pect, statutes.
In the past three years, thirteen state legislatures have enacted laws
in response to growing racial and religious terrorism. Most of these stat-
utes prohibit acts of harassment, intimidation, and defacement of prop-
erty.2 4 Some forbid mask-wearing 25 or the carrying of weapons in
certain circumstances. 26 Two prohibit paramilitary training,2 7 and one
new law requires that separate criminal statistics be kept by state police
for "incidents apparently directed against racial, religious, or ethnic
groups. ' ' 28 California has adopted a proposal that allows courts to en-
join advocacy of the commission of any act of violence at group meet-
ings under certain circumstances. 29 Texas has considered but not
22 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 31-2-125 (1983); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26-123 (Supp. 1983);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 11460 (West 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-101, -102 (West
1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 870.06 (West 1976); IDAHO CODE § 46-802 (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 129, § 220.94 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983); IOWA CODE ANN. § 29A.31 (West 1978); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 48-203 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38.440 (Baldwin 1980); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 29.31 (West 1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 37-A, § 1107 (1978); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 65, § 35 (1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 33, §§ 129-31 (West 1983); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 28.634 (Callaghan 1982); MISS. CODE ANN. § 33-1-31 (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 55-
176, -177 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 203.080 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-01-21 (1980);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 38.40.120 (1964); W. VA. CODE § 15-IF-7 (1979); WYo. STAT.
§ 19-1-106 (1977). A compilation of state criminal anti-Klan statutes is available from the
Klanwatch Project of the Southern Poverty Law Center, Montgomery, Alabama.
23 Anti-Klan Legislation Introduced in Texar, Alabama Legislatures, KLANWATCH INTELLIGENCE
REP., Mar. 1981, at 8.
24 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11410, 11411 (West 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-58 (1980);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 37 (West 1982); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 2C:33-10, -11 (1981);
N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 40-c (McKinney Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 166.155, .165
(1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-53-1, -2 (Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-710 (1982);
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.36.080 (1983); see also N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW § 28 (McKinney
Supp. 1983) (limited liability of parents for children's destruction or defacement of religious
property); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.190, .200 (1981) (providing civil liability for violation of OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 166.155, .165).
25 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-372 (West Supp. 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 876.155
(West Supp. 1983).
26 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.2 (Supp. 1983); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5515 (Purdon
1983).
27 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-206b (West Supp. 1983); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5515 (Purdon 1983).
28 MD. ANN. CODE art. 88B, §§ 9, 10 (Supp. 1983).
29 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.7 (West Supp. 1984) provides in part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any group, association, organization, society, or other
assemblage of two or more persons to meet and to advocate, and to take substantial
action in furtherance of, the commission of an unlawful act of violence or force directed
to and likely to produce the imminent and unlawful infliction of serious bodily injury or
death of another person within this state.
(b) Whenever it reasonably appears that any group, association, society, or other
assemblage of two or more persons has met and taken substantial action in furtherance of
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adopted a proposal to prohibit members of secret societies from bringing
firearms to their meetings.30
Many state laws thus attempt to restrict both the violent and non-
violent activities of extremist groups, rather than focusing directly on
their violent activities.3 ' Anti-mask statutes and laws restricting meet-
ing activities raise serious first amendment questions. The constitutional
rights of Klan members and Nazis to freedom of expression and associa-
tion may well limit the effectiveness of legislative efforts to curtail their
activities.
1. Speech Rights and Violent Extremist Groups
The first amendment guarantees of free speech and free associa-
tion 32 apply to all citizens regardless of the views they espouse. In the
landmark first amendment case of Brandenburg v. Ohio,33 the United
States Supreme Court overturned the conviction of a Klan leader for
violation of an Ohio criminal syndicalism statute. Brandenburg had
been convicted for suggesting in a speech at a Klan rally that it might be
necessary to take some "revengeance" if the federal government contin-
ued "to suppress the white, Caucasian race . . . . 34 The Court held
that:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit
a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law viola-
tion except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing immi-
nent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.35
Brandenburg created a broad protection for the speech activities of
violent extremist groups. Neither the states nor the federal government
can punish such groups for merely advocating violence as a means of
achieving their ends. Only when speech amounts to the planning or
the commission of an act of violence made unlawful by subdivision (a) and will engage in
those acts in the future, any aggrieved individual may bring a civil action in the superior
court to enjoin the advocacy of the commission of any act of violence made unlawful by
subdivision (a) at any future meeting or meetings. Upon a proper showing by clear and
convincing evidence, a permanent or preliminary injunction, restraining order, or writ of
mandate shall be granted.
See Update on Recent Legislative Efforts to Curtail Klan Activities, KLANWATCH INTELLIGENCE
REP., June 1981, at 4.
30 Anti-Klan Legislation, supra note 23, at 8.
31 Presumably, states already have criminal statutes proscribing violent crimes such as
murder, rape, assault, battery, and robbery. State legislatures have not focused on improving
the enforcement of these statutes in cases of racially motivated violence. See infra notes 82-110
and accompanying text.
32 U.S. CONST. amend. I provides in part: "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging
the freedom of speech. . . or the right of the people peaceably to assemble ..
33 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
34 Id. at 446.
35 Id. at 447 (footnote omitted).
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encouragement of imminent criminal conduct, where such conduct is
likely to occur, can the government proscribe the speech itself.36 Branden-
burg's distinction between mere advocacy and the planning of imminent
violence makes it difficult to draft a statute that will meet its standard,
and even more difficult to enforce such a statute in a manner that will
prevent violence.
The first amendment may also protect the wearing of masks, mili-
tary-style uniforms, or swastikas as symbolic expression. Underlying
state anti-mask statutes is the assumption that people are more likely to
engage in violent or unlawful activities if their identities are unknown,
as well as the knowledge that identification of those who engage in such
activities assists police efforts to make arrests.3 7  Anti-mask statutes,
however, face constitutional problems.
State courts have struck down statutes prohibiting the public wear-
ing of masks that conceal the identity of the wearer. In Ghafari v. Munici-
pal Court of San Francisco,38 the California Court of Appeal invalidated
that state's anti-mask statute3 9 on overbreadth,4° vagueness4' and equal
36 The Court in Brandenburg also stated that "'the mere abstract teaching . . . of the
moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as
preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action.' " Id. at 448 (quoting Noto
v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 298 (1961)). This reference seems to indicate that a statute
such as the California law forbidding meetings for the purpose of planning violent attacks on
others might be constitutional if it is applied only to meetings of groups planning imminent
violence. See supra text accompanying note 29; see also Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973)
(to be proscribed, words must be intended to produce, and likely to produce, inminent
disorder).
37 See Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90, 91 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Johnson, Can the State
Unmask the Klan?, 45 Ky. BENCH & B., Apr. 1981, at 8, 9.
38 87 Cal. App. 3d 255, 150 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1978).
39 Section 650 of the Penal Code provided:
It is a misdemeanor for any person, either alone or in company with others, to ap-
pear on any street or highway, or in other public places or any place open to view by the
general public, with his face partially or completely concealed by means of a mask or
other regalia or paraphernalia, with intent thereby to conceal his identity. This section
does not prohibit the wearing of such means of concealment in good faith for the purpose
of amusement, entertainment or in compliance with any public health order.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 650a (West 1976).
40 87 Cal. App. 3d at 262, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 816. The statute was held overbroad because
its complete prohibition infringed first amendment activities (here, a demonstration by
masked Iranian students protesting the rule of the Shah of Iran). As in the Aryan case, in fta
note 49 and accompanying text, the students feared reprisals against themselves and their
families if their identities were known. Id. at 259, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 814. The Ghafari court
also expressed the view that the statute's prohibition went beyond any legitimate law enforce-
ment concern because another state statute, CAL. PENAL CODE § 185 (West 1976), existed
that prohibited the wearing of a mask for the purpose of avoiding identification in the com-
mission of an offense. Id. at 261-62, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
41 The statute was held unconstitutionally vague because the exception for amusement or
entertainment purposes forced speakers, the police, and courts to make impossible distinctions
along a continuum of forms of expression, thereby causing a chilling effect on first amend-
ment rights. Id. at 263-64, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 817-18.
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protection grounds.42 In Robinson v. State,43 the Florida Supreme Court
invalidated Florida's anti-mask statute44 because it was overbroad.
45
Ghafari and Robinson make it clear that blanket prohibitions on mask-
wearing are not acceptable under the first amendment. 46 The appel-
lants in both cases also argued that their mask-wearing was a form of
symbolic speech fully protected by the first amendment, 47 but neither
the Giafari nor the Robinson court reached that issue.48
The only court to consider whether the first amendment protects
the wearing of masks where it is a form of symbolic speech upheld the
right to wear masks. In Ayan v. Mackq 49 Iranian students successfully
challenged a Texas Technical University decision forbidding them to
wear masks during their demonstration against the Shah of Iran. The
district court noted that the wearing of masks by Iranian demonstrators
had become "a symbol of opposition to a regime which is of such a
character that its detractors believe they must disguise their identity to
protect themselves." °50 The court relied heavily on the University's fail-
ure to support its assertions that the anonymity of the demonstrators
would foster disruptive or violent conduct.51
42 The statute was held to violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment because it abridged fundamental first amendment rights and did not serve a compelling
state interest. Moreover, the statute created impermissible content regulation because of its
exception for amusing or entertaining speech. Id. at 264-65, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 818; see alo
Note, Constitutional Law-Statute Prohibiting the Wearing of Maskr in Public is Unconstitutional as
Overbroad and Vague and as Denying Equal Protection of the Laws, 19 SANTA CL.ARA L. REv. 1137
(1979).
43 393 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. 1980).
44 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 876.13 (West 1976) provided:
No person or persons shall in this state, while wearing any mask, hood, or device
whereby any portion of the face is so hidden, concealed, or covered as to conceal the
identity of the wearer, enter upon, or be, or appear upon or within the public property of
any municipality or county of the state.
45 393 So. 2d at 1077. The statute was fatally overbroad because it was "susceptible of
application to entirely innocent activities." Id. A few months later, the Florida legislature
enacted a provision limiting the application of the statute to situations in which the mask is
worn with the intent to intimidate or harass another, or while engaged in criminal conduct,
or in other specified circumstances. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 876.155 (West Supp. 1982).
46 See supra notes 38-45.
47 Ghafari, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 266 n.5, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 819 n.5; Robinson, 393 So. 2d at
1077; see also Anti-Mask Law Ruled Out in Florida, KLANWATOH INTELLIGENCE REP., Mar.
1981, at 4.
48 See sources cited supra note 47.
49 462 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
50 Id. at 92.
51 Id. at 91, 93-4. Under United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), and Tinker v. Des
Moines Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), both involving "symbolic speech"
claims, a governmental regulation imposing incidental restrictions on free expression is valid
if: (1) "it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest," Aovan, 462 F. Supp. at
93, (2) "the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression," id., (3)
"there is a sufficient nexus between the restriction and the interest," id., and (4) the incidental
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The wearing of masks undoubtedly preserves the anonymity of
Klan members.52 Mask-wearing, however, may also have a communi-
cative aspect in certain circumstances that raises the wearing of the
traditional white hood-masks53 to the level of protected "symbolic
speech." 54 Although the first amendment does not grant an absolute
right to anonymity, 55 freedom of speech may be impaired "when there is
such a nexus between anonymity and speech that a bar on the first is
restriction of expression "is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest," id.
See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77; Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09. The Aryan court held that the
third requirement was not met, 462 F. Supp. at 93, as there was "no concrete proof that these
students in this demonstration will erupt into the violence that the no mask regulation is
supposed to prevent." Id. at 94. Because the connection between the mask prohibition and
the University's interest in preventing violence was "merely speculative," the regulation un-
constitutionally infringed free expression. Id.
52 The main purpose of wearing the masks may vary in different contexts. In a Klan-only
gathering, the primary purpose may be symbolic or ceremonial, as other members presuma-
bly know the identity of the wearer. In a march or public gathering, one purpose may be to
conceal the identity of the wearer, so as to avoid reprisal for espousing racist views or to
facilitate criminal conduct, or both. Another purpose may be to convey a symbolic message
to onlookers. See infta note 54 and accompanying text.
53 The traditional Klan regalia of white robe and pointed hood-mask dates back to the
Reconstruction Era, when the Klan was founded, although originally the costumes were
much more elaborate. See generally A History of Racism and Violence, supra note 1, at 6-19;
D. CHALMERS, HOODED AMERICANISM 11-16 (1965). Klan members have continued to wear
the masks during public marches and at Klan ceremonies.
54 The Supreme Court has yet to articulate a complete test for determining whether par-
ticular conduct constitutes "symbolic speech" within the protection of the first amendment.
It is clear that conduct may not be labeled "speech" simply because "the person engaging in
the conduct intends thereby to express an idea." O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376. The Court has
looked to "the nature of... [the] activity, combined with the factual context and environ-
ment in which it was undertaken," to determine whether protected expression was involved.
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1974). In Spence, the Court held that the taping
of a peace symbol to an American flag in protest of the Cambodian invasion and Kent State
killings was a form of protected "symbolic speech," and that the state had not demonstrated a
compelling interest in prohibiting such a display. Id. at 415. The Court noted that the de-
fendant had "[aln intent to convey a particularized message," and that "the likelihood was
great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it." Id. at 410-11. The
particular messages conveyed by Klan members wearing robes and hood-masks are undoubt-
edly that they consider themselves to be an "invisible empire" (i.e., that they are representa-
tives of an invisible government), and that they continue to espouse the views and traditional
practices of their racist predecessors dating back over a century. See, e.g., J. MECKLING, THE
Ku K.tux KLAN: A STUDY OF THE AMERICAN MIND 68, 77, 97, 106-7 (1963). The intense
opposition of many to organized marches by Klan members suggests that their message is
understood. See, e.g., Texas Klan Marches to Provoke Outrage Among Citizenry, KLANWATCH IN-
TELLIGENCE REP., June/July 1983, at 1-2. The context in which the mask is worn, however, is
crucial to this analysis. The wearing of Klan masks in a scheduled march, with an adequate
police presence to prevent violence, may well be a form of protected "symbolic speech." See
generally Johnson, supra note 37, at 8. But the wearing of masks in public by Klan members
when not engaged in such established first amendment activities is unlikely to constitute a
form of "symbolic speech," because it becomes less likely that the purpose of wearing the
mask is to convey a message. See infra note 58.
55 ee tyan, 462 F. Supp. at 92.
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tantamount to a prohibition on the second."'5 6 Because Klan members
may face private reprisals upon revelation of their membership,57 free
exercise of the right to publicly demonstrate may be possible only when
members are allowed to preserve their anonymity. Thus, in the context
of a scheduled public demonstration, 5 a state can constitutionally pro-
hibit Klan members from wearing their masks only when it can demon-
strate that violence is reasonably likely to occur.59
The first amendment also protects the right of violent extremist
groups to publicly demonstrate, and to wear military uniforms and the
swastika, even in communities strongly opposed to the groups' presence.
In a series of state and federal decisions6o arising out of the planned
march of American Nazis through Skokie, Illinois, the courts held that
residents could not prevent the Nazi march nor preclude the wearing of
the party uniform, the display of the swastika, or the distribution of
anti-Semitic literature.61 The Skokie litigation establishes that permissi-
ble limitations on the speech and demonstrations of violent extremist
56 Id. The Supreme Court has long recognized the close connection between anonymity
in some contexts and the preservation of first amendment freedoms. In NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449 (1958), the Court invalidated a state statute requiring the NAACP to turn over
its membership lists, where it was clear that members would be subjected to reprisals because
of their membership in the organization. In Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960), the
Court invalidated a city ordinance requiring those printing or distributing handbills to print
their names and addresses on the handbills. In both cases, the Court expressed concern that
those espousing dissident beliefs would be deterred from engaging in speech and association
activities if their identities were known. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462; Tallfq, 362 U.S. at 64; see
also Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523-24 (1960). As the Court explained in Tally,
"[p]ersecuted groups and sects from time to time throughout history have been able to criti-
cize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all." Tally, 362 U.S. at 64.
57 See infra note 80.
58 Only in the context of a public demonstration do the symbolic speech and anonymous
association purposes served by the masks sufficiently outweigh the masks' potential for en-
couraging or facilitating criminal conduct. Outside the context of public demonstrations,
which are overseen by adequate police force to prevent violence, the wearing of masks by
Klan members can be properly regulated.
59 Compare Ghafari, supra notes 38-42, 46-48 and accompanying text, with Agan, supra notes
49-51 and accompanying text.
60 A discussion of the events and cases that eventually decided the controversy can be
found in G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1275-78 (1980).
61 Skokie, a community with a large Jewish population including many Holocaust survi-
vors, obtained an Illinois trial court injunction prohibiting the National Socialist Party from
parading in the party uniform, displaying the swastika, and distributing anti-Semitic and
racist literature. Both the Illinois appellate court and Supreme Court refused to stay the
injunction pending appeal, but the United States Supreme Court reversed these decisions.
National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977). The Illinois
appellate court then modified the injunction, retaining only the requirement that the Nazis
not display the swastika. The court held that such a display was analogous to "fighting
words" in this context, and therefore not protected symbolic speech. Village of Skokie v.
National Socialist Party of America, 51 111. App. 3d 279, 366 N.E.2d 347 (1977). The Illinois
Supreme Court then held the entire injunction unconstitutional as an unlawful restraint of
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groups are minimal. 62
Thus, the Brandenburg standard 63 of incitement to imminent lawless
action, and the possible validity of narrowly drawn anti-mask statutes
64
seem to mark the limits of constitutional legislation against the speech-
related activities of violent extremist groups.
2. Associational Rzghts and Violent Extremist Groups
Legislative efforts to curb the violent activities of extremist group
members may also infringe the members' right of association. In
NAACP v. Alabama ,65 the first case to recognize such a right explicitly,
the United States Supreme Court invalidated an Alabama statute re-
quiring membership lists of the NAACP's Alabama chapters as an un-
constitutional restraint on the members' right to associate freely for
lawful purposes. The Court weighed the state's interest in obtaining the
lists66 against the "uncontroverted showing" of the NAACP that past
disclosures of members' names had subjected them to hostile economic
and social pressures. 67 Finding that disclosure of the names had little
bearing on the state's legitimate interests, the Court ruled that the de-
protected expression. Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America, 69 Ill. 2d 605,
373 N.E.2d 21 (1978) (holding that the swastika was protected symbolic speech).
Skokie then passed three new parade permit ordinances, in a second attempt to prevent
the demonstration. The ordinances required (1) that public liability ($300,000) and property
damage ($50,000) insurance be obtained before issuance of parade permits, SKOKIE, ILL.,
VILLAGE CODE ch. 27, §§ 50-67 (1977); (2) that no material inciting racial or religious hatred
could be distributed with intent to incite such hatred, SKOKIE, ILL., VILLAGE CODE ch. 28,
§ 43 (1977); and (3) that no military-style uniforms could be worn by demonstrating political
parties SKOKIE, ILL., VILLAGE CODE ch. 28, § 42 (1977). A federal district court and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit struck down all three ordinances on
first amendment grounds. Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill. 1978), aj'd, 578 F.2d
1197 (7th Cir. 1978). Skokie's plea to the United States Supreme Court for a stay of the
Seventh Circuit's ruling pending appeal was denied. Smith v. Collin, 436 U.S. 953 (1978).
The denial of the stay came thirteen days before the scheduled march. Having won the fight,
the Nazis cancelled the Skokie march three days before it was to take place, but used the
precedents created to gain long- denied access to Chicago city parks. G. GUNTHER, supra note
60, at 1277. Skokie's petition for review of the denial of the stay was also refused. Smith v.
Collin, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
62 See Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916, 919 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Symbolic
speech issues raised in the Skokie cases seem to firmly establish first amendment protection for
the wearing of military uniforms and the swastika in public demonstrations. For discussion of
a later argument that paramilitary training should be considered protected speech and associ-
ation, see infla notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
63 See supra text accompanying notes 33-36.
64 See supra text accompanying notes 38-59.
65 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958).
66 The "exclusive purpose" of the state in requesting the membership lists "was to deter-
mine whether [the NAACP] was conducting intrastate business in violation of the Alabama
foreign corporation registration statute." Id. at 464. The Court held that disclosure of rank-
and-file members' names would have no substantial bearing on this issue. Id.
67 Id. at 462.
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mand for membership lists infringed unduly on the associational inter-
ests of members of the NAACP. 68
The Court in NAACP carefully distinguished Byant v. Zimerman,69
in which the Court in 1928 had upheld a New York statute requiring
certain unincorporated associations to turn over various information, in-
cluding a complete membership roster.70 In rejecting a New York
Klansman's challenge to the validity of the statute, the Court in Byant
took judicial notice of the Klan's violent and unlawful activities and
assumed that the New York legislature knew of such activities when it
drafted the statute.7 1 The Court concluded that the statute was valid as
a reasonable exercise of the state's police power. 72
The Court in Bryant allowed the states to treat the Ku Klux Klan
differently from other organizations because of the Klan's unlawful ac-
tivities.73 In NAACP, the Court reasoned that the states could require
membership lists from local Klans, but not from NAACP chapters, be-
cause of the "markedly different considerations in terms of the interest
of the State in obtaining disclosure."'74 This newly created balancing
test weighs the likelihood and gravity of a chilling effect on the exercise
of association against the state's legitimate interest in obtaining the in-
formation. 75 Where an organization's purpose is to engage in unlawful
conduct, such as violence and intimidation, the compelling interest of
the state in regulating such activities would presumably outweigh all
but the strongest free association claims.
The distinction made in Brant and reaffirmed in NAACP may be
losing its vitality, however. Brant was decided in 1928, long before the
"right of association" was even recognized as such. 76 Moreover, enforce-
68 Id. at 463-65.
69 278 U.S. 63 (1928), cited in NAACP, 357 U.S. at 465-66.
70 Byant, 278 U.S. at 66.
7t Id. at 76; NAACP, 357 U.S. at 465. The Court in NAACP also distinguished Byant on
the basis that the Klan organization involved there had made no effort to comply with any
part of the New York statute, whereas the NAACP had complied with all provisions of the
Alabama disclosure law, except the membership list requirements. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 465-
66.
72 Bgyant, 278 U.S. at 72.
73 Id. at 73-76; NAACP, 357 U.S. at 465.
74 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 465.
75 The courts continue to use this test today. See, e.g., Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661
F.2d 1243, 1264-72 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Hastings v. North East Indep. School Dist., 615 F.2d
628, 632 (5th Cir. 1980); Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 544 F.2d 182, 192 (5th Cir. 1976); see also
Shelton v. United States, 404 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Klan leader convicted of contempt
of Congress for failure to submit subpoenaed information), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1024 (1969).
76 The balancing test applied in NAACP was not used in Bgant because "freedom of asso-
ciation" was simply not yet a defined constitutional right. In fact, the first amendment was
not even discussed in Bryant. The defendant's arguments were based on the privileges or
immunities, due process, and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. 278
U.S. at 65, 71-73.
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ment of the New York statute in Byant did not pose the danger that
Klan members would face harassment or economic hardship when their
affiliation was revealed. 77 Today, while the Klan appears to be gaining
in acceptance among some segments of society,78 other segments appear
adamantly opposed to it.79 Thus, Klan members may well face eco-
nomic and social reprisals upon revelation of their membership.8 0 In
these circumstances, the associational interests of Klan members may
outweigh any legitimate interest of the state in obtaining membership
lists.
Klan members do not have, however, an absolute right to anonym-
ity whenever they face private reprisals. While the first amendment
guarantees the freedom to associate for the purpose of espousing and
advocating racism, it does not protect association for the purpose of pur-
suing racist ends through violence and intimidation.8 ' The outcome of
applying the NAACP balancing test to the question of whether a state
can obtain Klan membership lists depends on the particular circum-
stances involved, such as the severity of the group's unlawful conduct
and the likelihood that the members' freedom to associate would be
threatened.
B. PROBLEMS WITH STATE ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS
State legislation that meets the constitutional standards described
above can deter extremist group violence only if police, prosecutors, and
courts enforce the statutes. In the early 1960's, state court systems com-
77 When the New York statute upheld in Bryant was enacted in the mid-1920's, the Klan
was at the peak of its size and power. Klan membership reached four to five million, and
Klansmen and former Klansmen served as governors, congressmen, senators, and other high
officials, both state and federal. Supreme Court Justice and former United States Senator
Hugo L. Black had been a member during this period. See A History of Racism and Vio-
lence, supra note 1, at 17, 19-20; D. CHALMERS supra note 53, at 3-5, 313-16. Future exercise
of Klan members' right of association probably would not have been affected significantly by
revelation of their identities in 1928. However, future exercise of the right of association by
many NAACP members would have been rendered all but impossible by revelation of their
identities in 1958. See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462, 466.
78 See infia notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
79 This is apparent from the growth of community opposition to Klan marches, for exam-
ple, and the growth of an anti-Klan movement. See, e.g., Texas Klan Marches to Provoke Outrage
Among Citizenry, supra note 54.
80 In at least two recent federal civil rights cases, employees have sued their employers on
claims that they were fired because of revelations of their membership in the Ku Klux Klan.
See Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, 508 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1974); Savina v. Gebhart, 497 F. Supp.
65 (D. Md. 1980).
81 The difficulty of legislating within this constitutional boundary is that while all Klan
groups engage in unlawful activities to some degree, the inclination of individual Klan groups
toward violence varies substantially. Seegenerally D. CHALMERS, supra note 53, at 296-99, 376;
Nesselson, supra note 10, at 12.
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pletely failed to curb the violent activities of organized racist groups. 82
The failure of local prosecutors to bring suit against, 8 3 and of local juries
to convict, 84 perpetrators of racial violence during the 1960's resulted in
increased pressure on the United States Department of Justice to en-
force the Reconstruction Era federal civil rights statutes.8 5
Successful federal prosecutions of some of the perpetrators of racial
violence demonstrated the failure of state court systems.8 6 The defend-
ants in United States v. Price8 7 were eventually convicted of civil rights
violations for the murders of three civil rights workers in Philadelphia,
Mississippi, in 1964, though a local grand jury had refused to indict the
killers for murder.88 Although a Georgia jury found two Ku Klux
Klansmen 89 not guilty of the murder of a black educator in 1964,90 they
were later convicted of violating the victim's civil rights.9 ' In a case
involving the Selma, Alabama slayings of two civil rights demonstrators
by Klansmen in 1965, an Alabama state court acquittal of the defend-
ants9 2 was followed quickly by their indictment and conviction for viola-
tions of the federal criminal civil rights statutes.93
Some government officials believe that state court systems have
been generally more reliable in the prosecution and conviction of perpe-
trators of racial violence in the 1980's than they were in the 1960's. 94
State court juries still fail to convict some apparently guilty defendants,
82 Increasing Violence, supra note 1, at 28; Comment, Federal Civil Action Against Private Indi-
vidualsfor Crimes Involving CivilRights, 74 YALE LJ. 1462, 1463 (1965); Note, Discretion to Prose-
cute Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 74 YALE L.J. 1297, 1302 (1965).
83 Note, Discretion to Prosecute, supra note 82, at 1301; Comment, Federal Civil Action, supra
note 82, at 1463.
84 See infra text accompanying notes 86-93; Comment, Federal Civil Action, supra note 82, at
1463.
85 It took the brutal slayings of civil rights activists during the summer of 1964 and the
national outrage that resulted from state court acquittals of their murderers to induce the
Justice Department to prosecute the offenders under the criminal civil rights statutes. Fisher,
Double Jeopardy and Federalism, 50 MINN. L. REv. 607 (1966); Comment, Theories of Federalism
and Civil Rights, 75 YALE L.J. 1007, 1041 (1966).
86 These 1960's prosecutions also made possible judicial review and reinterpretation of the
Reconstruction Era criminal civil rights statutes. See infra notes 124-29.
87 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
88 A History of Racism and Violence, supra note 1, at 22 (inset).
89 Comment, supra note 85, at 1041 n.165.
90 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 748 n.1 (1966) (quoting from district court opin-
ion, 246 F. Supp. 475, 487 (1965)).
91 The United States Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of the federal indictment
against the Klansmen. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966);see B. SHIPP, MURDER AT
BROAD RIVER BRIDGE 78-84 (1981).
92 Fisher, supra note 85, at 607 (Viola Liuzzo murder).
93 Comment, supra note 85, at 1041 n.165.
94 Telephone interview, supra note 4. The improvement is due largely to the increased
willingness of local prosecutors to seek indictments against offenders, particularly in well-
publicized incidents of violence.
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however. For example, an all-white jury acquitted the six Klansmen
and Nazis tried for the killings of the Greensboro demonstrators, 95 even
though the jury was shown television films of the defendants removing
their guns from an automobile trunk, deliberately stalking their victims,
and of at least one of the defendants firing several bullets into the body
of a demonstrator. 96
The state criminal prosecutions of three members of the Justice
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan charged with shooting five elderly black
women in Chattanooga 97 ended in two acquittals and one twenty-
month jail sentence.98 Yet a subsequent civil lawsuit against the
Klansmen and the Justice Knights brought in federal court under the
federal civil rights statutes resulted in ajury damages award of $535,000
for the victims.99
Other problems with state criminal prosecutions persist. Assault
and intimidation convictions in racial violence cases are often met with
short or suspended sentences, and even some severe injury and death
cases result in relatively lenient sentences. t00 Moreover, local prosecu-
tors often dismiss incidents of intimidation as "pranks," without serious
investigation. 101 Local prosecutors sometimes ignore housing interfer-
ence incidents, such as shootings into blacks' homes that do not cause
physical injuries.102
Many factors contribute to the failure of local prosecutors to bring
suit and of local juries to convict. The continued prevalence of racism
and prejudice helps to explain the inadequate response of local legal
systems to racial violence and intimidation. In a random-sample survey
of the nine-county Chattanooga area in early 1982,103 over thirty-two
95 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
96 A History of Racism and Violence, supra note 1, at 49; King, supra note 11, at 160. The
reasons for the state court acquittal are not altogether clear. One commentator observed,
"[a]t that time, many trial observers state[d] that trial improprieties-including the un-
abashed anti-Communist bias of the district attorney and jury combined with defense team
red-baiting-all but precluded a guilty verdict." Charns, supra note 2, at 9. A federal grand
jury investigation that ended in April 1983 resulted in indictments of five out of the six who
were acquitted and four other alleged conspirators. Charns,Jui
, 
indicts Nazis and Klan in kill-
ings, IN THESE TIMES, May 4-10, 1983, at 6, col. 1. All nine defendants were acquitted,
however, at the conclusion of the federal trial in April 1984. See infra note 163.
97 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
98 Increasing Violence, supra note 1, at 81; Seltzer, Survey Finds Extensive Klan Sympathy, Pov-
ERTY L. REP., May/June 1982, at 7. The convicted defendant was paroled after four months.
99 Seltzer, supra note 98, at 7; Crumsey v. Justice Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Civ. Act.
No. 1-80-287 (E.D. Tenn. 1980). Commentators have suggested that in civil rights cases dam-
ages are easier to obtain than criminal convictions. Comment, supra note 82, at 1464 & n. 11.
100 Telephone interview, supra note 4.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 The National Jury Project conducted the survey in connection with the Chattanooga
civil case of Crumsey v. Justice Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Civ. Act. No. 1-80-287 (E.D.
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percent of all white respondents reported that they liked the Ku Klux
Klan or some aspects of it. 104 Even more disturbing were the findings of
the survey that over forty-eight percent of the respondents agreed that
the right of blacks to demonstrate should be restricted, and that almost
fifty-five percent thought that "[t]here needs to be an organization to
stand up for the rights of white people."' 0 5 The intensity of such feel-
ings tends to increase during periods of racial tension, making convic-
tions of guilty defendants even more difficult to obtain.1
0 6
While such attitudes are more prevalent in some areas than others,
racism is still a nationwide problem. Studies indicate that twenty-five
to thirty-five percent of all Americans still harbor anti-Semitic stereo-
types.107 In addition, Gallup polls have shown a noticeable increase
over the past ten years in the number of persons who approve of Klan
activities.' 08 Such attitudes have been shared by enough voters in some
areas to result in major party nominations of avowed Klan and Nazi
Congressional candidates.'0 9
Tenn. 1980). The success of the plaintiffs in this federal lawsuit against the defendants who
were acquitted or given light sentences in the state criminal prosecution (Supra notes 98-99
and accompanying text) adds weight to the asserted connection between the attitudes re-
flected in the survey and the failure of state court systems to respond adequately to racially-
motivated violence.
104 Seltzer, supra note 98, at 7.
105 Id. at 8, 13.
106 See general'y A History of Racism and Violence, supra note 1, at 41. The failed state
prosecutions in Greensboro and Chattanooga followed shooting incidents that occurred in the
context of tense racial situations. In Greensboro, the shooting occurred during the last of a
series of clashes between anti-Klan demonstrators and Klansmen in North Carolina. Eigho-
eight Seconds in Greerboro, Frontline (Public Broadcast System) (Jan. 24, 1983). In Chatta-
nooga, the shooting occurred soon after televised debates between local NAACP officers and
Klan leaders, and in the midst of a recruiting drive by local Klan factions. Telephone inter-
view with George A. Key, President of the Chattanooga Chapter of the NAACP (April 23,
1984). In such circumstances, the relative swiftness with which local prosecutions come to
trial may actually be a detriment to success, because the often all-white jury is drawn from a
local populace that well remembers the tense period of confrontation. Aware that punish-
ment is less likely and less severe when violent attacks on minorities occur in the context of
riots or other social unrest, Klan members instigate or exacerbate such situations, attempting
to create a climate in which they can engage freely in beatings, killings, and other violence. A
History of Racism and Violence, supra note 1, at 51. As a result, local legal systems are least
likely to produce a certain and adequate response to such violence when it is needed most. See
infia note 113 and accompanying text.
107 Polls reftct increase in racist attitudes, supra note 1, at 15.
108 In a 1980 Gallup Poll, 10% of the national population expressed favorable attitudes
toward the Klan. Increasing Violence, supra note 1, at 80 (statement of Irwin Suall, Anti-Defa-
mation League, New York).
109 In 1980, Tom Metzger, an outspoken racist and leader of the California Knights of the
Ku Klux Klan, won the Democratic nomination for Congress in the San Diego area. Al-
though he lost in the general election, he still garnered 35,000 votes (14%). Id. at 79. Gerald
Carlson, a former Klansman and neo-Nazi, who openly espoused racist and anti-Semitic be-
liefs, captured the Republican nomination for Congress in the Dearborn, Michigan area.
Carlson also lost in the general election, but received 53,000 votes. Id. at 80. In 1982, Jerry
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The continuing inability of state and local legal systems to deter
and punish racially motivated violent criminals should be met consist-
ently with efforts to improve state legislation and judicial enforce-
ment.1 10 Such improvements, however, can be realized only over a
long-term period. Increased reliance on federal civil rights remedies
would provide an immediate and effective supplement to state enforce-
ment systems. These federal civil rights remedies are explored in the
next section.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: ENFORCEMENT OF
RECONSTRUCTION ERA FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS
While long-term improvements in state enforcement systems can
and should be made,11 immediate remedies for racial violence and in-
timidation are available under the federal civil rights statutes.1 12 Fed-
eral criminal prosecutions and private civil suits under federal civil
rights laws offer an effective alternative or supplement to state court
systems. Because the Department of Justice or a private litigant prose-
cutes or brings suit in federal court, the biases of local citizens have less
impact on the initiation of an action. As federal district court juries are
drawn generally from a much wider area than local juries,' 13 there is less
chance that the racial tensions that may have surrounded a violent inci-
Brown defeated Metzger for the California Democratic nomination for the United States
Senate, but Metzger received 76,502 votes (7%). Voters reject Klan-backed candidates, POVERTY
L. REP., Nov./Dec. 1982, at 4.
110 As the bias of state court juries seems to present a major problem, improvement efforts
should include ending the prevalence of all-white juries and improving public education on
racial issues. Present efforts to make state court juries representative of local populations,
however, are being hampered by the Supreme Court's refusal to review the rule of Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), which upheld the right of local prosecutors to use peremptory
challenges to exclude blacks from juries in individual cases. McCray v. New York, 103 S. Ct.
2438 (1983); see also Riley, Selecting a Trial Panel- Whose Peers Are They?, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 20,
1984, at 1, col. 3. Other ways to improve the state system include establishing mandatory
maximum sentences for crimes of violence involving racial animus and encouraging public
officials to speak out against acts of racial violence and intimidation.
111 See supra note 110.
112 As stated in the introduction, the most effective approach to deterring and punishing
racial violence is a two-tiered system of federal prosecution and civil remedies, combined with
improvements in state legislation and enforcement systems.
113 Mishkin, The Federal Question in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 175 (1953).
As Mishkin notes:
With the possible exception of a place like the Southern District of New York, the federal
judicial district will generally be larger than the comparable state unit. Despite the pro-
visions for appointment of jurors within a district, 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (Supp. 1952), the
federal venue will tend to include a greater mixture of urban dwellers, suburbanites and
rural residents, with their varying social and economic backgrounds, than will the state
panels.
Id. at 175 n.87.
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dent will have undue influence. 114 Finally, federal involvement in a
tense racial situation, through a grand jury investigation t 15 or a prosecu-
tion, can help to deter future acts of violence."
16
A. RECENT CRIMINAL CASES UNDER FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS
STATUTES
Several federal criminal statutes, both new and old,' 7 can effec-
tively punish and deter the perpetrators of racist and religious violence.
Enforcement of these statutes is especially important when a state crimi-
nal prosecution has failed, or has resulted in a lenient sentence that is
unlikely to deter future outbreaks of violence."" Federal prosecution of
defendants acquitted in state trials does not violate the double jeopardy
rule, 19 and the penalties available under the federal civil rights statutes
are adequate to deter and punish racial and religious violence. 120 Since
the mid-1970's, the United States Department of Justice has increased
the number of prosecutions brought against private defendants under
114 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
115 A federal grand jury hears evidence as presented by a United States Attorney, to deter-
mine whether there is probable cause to believe that a federal crime has been committed. See
generally A.B.A. SEC. JuD. AD., FEDERAL GRAND JURY HANDBOOK 11 (1959).
116 Increasing Violence, supra note 1, at 29.
117 This Comment discusses those civil rights statutes that reach private acts of racial or
religious violence and intimidation, as opposed to conduct involving "state action." The ma-
jority of such violence and intimidation is now limited to the private context, and the stan-
dards of conduct affecting state officers are now defined with relative clarity. Seegenerally F.
INBAU, M. ASPEN & J. SPIOTTO, PROTECTIVE SECURITY LAW 1-20, 33-43, 93-102 (1983).
The Comment focuses primarily on the two surviving Reconstruction Era statutes di-
rected at private racial violence and intimidation (18 U.S.C. § 241 (1982) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(c) (1976)), rather than on modern civil rights statutes (see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1982),
discussed infia at notes 160-63), because the explicit language of the modern statutes clearly
defines their scope. They do not possess the broad language and potential for expanded inter-
pretation of the older statutes. See injra note 153 and accompanying text.
118 See supra notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
119 The fact that someone has been tried for an offense in a state court, whether found
guilty or acquitted, does not preclude prosecution of the same defendant for the same physi-
cal act in a federal court, so long as the act is an offense under federal law. Abbate v. United
States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). This is a well-estabished
exception to the "double jeopardy" rule, a prohibition of double prosecution for the same
crime, guaranteed by the fifth amendment.
120 Violators of 18 U.S.C. § 241, a felony statute, face fines up to $10,000 and imprison-
ment up to ten years, or both. When death results from a violation of § 241, violators are
subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1982).
Violators of 18 U.S.C. § 245 may be fined $1000 or imprisoned up to one year, or both.
Where bodily injury results from a violation of § 245, violators are subject to fines up to
$10,000 and imprisonment up to ten years, and if death results, violators are subject to impris-
onment for any term of years or for life. 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1982).
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the federal civil rights statutes,' 2 ' but calls for more vigorous enforce-
ment continue. 122 Federal prosecutions for private racial violence are
brought primarily under three statutes; 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 245, and
42 U.S.C. § 3631.123
The broad language of 18 U.S.C. § 241124 prohibits private conspir-
121








Sources: Increasing Violence, supra note 1, at 90 (statement of Drew S. Days III, then Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Dept. of Justice); Telephone interview, supra
note 4; Telephone interview with Daniel Rinzel, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil
Rights Division of the United States Department ofJustice, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 6, 1984).
122 COMMISSION STATEMENT, supra note 5, at 24 nn.26 & 29; National Anti-Klan Network
Launches Drive Against Racial Violence, KLANWATCH INTELLIGENCE REP., Apr. 1983, at 1.
123 As discussed supra in note 117, this section focuses on 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1982). For a
discussion of 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1982), see infra notes 160-63 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (1976), see inra note 156 and accompanying text.
124 18 U.S.C. § 241 provides:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citi-
zen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same;
or
If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another,
with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so
secured-
They shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years,
or both; and if death results, they shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years
or for life.
Section 241 is the current version of § 6 of the Enforcement Act of 1870, 2 ch. 114, 16 Stat.
140 (1870), enacted immediately after ratification of the fifteenth amendment to enforce that
amendment. Section 241 has been the subject of longstanding disagreement among courts
and commentators on two related questions of constitutional import: (I) to what extent does
the section proscribe wholly private conduct, as opposed to conduct involving "state action,"
and (2) what are the rights "secured by" the Constitution and laws of the United States?
The first question depends largely on whether Congress can proscribe wholly private
action under the fifth section of the fourteenth amendment in order to enforce that amend-
ment. The United States Supreme Court held in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883),
that Congress' power under the first and fifth sections extended only to the correction of
discriminatory state action. See Gressman, The Unhappy Histo-y of Civil Rights Legislation, 50
MICH. L. REv. 1323 (1952). The Supreme Court has not since ruled directly on this issue,
although six Justices stated in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), that Congress did
have the power to reach private action under the fifth section of the fourteenth amendment if
necessary to enforce that amendment. See id. at 761-62, 774-86. At least one United States
Circuit Court of Appeals has held that Congress has such power under section five. Action v.
Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971);seealso Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co., 507 F.2d 206,
vacatedas moot, 507 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1975) (upheld 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) as proper exercise of
congressional power under section five of the fourteenth amendment). But see Murphy v.
Mount Carmel High School, 543 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1976). While all of these cases subse-
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acies against any citizen's "free exercise . . .of any right or privilege
secured. . . by the Constitution or laws of the United States .... ,,125
Reading the statute in light of the relatively few cases interpreting it,126
quent to Guest have ruled on the question from the perspective of § 1985(c), rather than
§ 241, the issue of congressional power is the same for both sections. See Frantz, Congressional
Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353 (1964) and
sources cited therein at 1353 n.4.
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the view that the fourteenth amendment itself
"protects the individual against state action, not against wrongs done by individuals," without
specifically addressing the question of Congress' power under the fifth section of the amend-
ment. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 610 v. Scott, 103 S.
Ct. 3352, 3357 (1983) (emphasis in original). In Scott, the Court held that § 1985(c), a civil
provision roughly analogous to § 241, does not provide a remedy for private conspiracies
against the fourteenth amendment rights of citizens "unless. . .the state is involved in the
conspiracy or. . .the aim of the conspiracy is to influence the activity of the state." Id. at
3357. Specifically, the Court ruled that wholly private conspiracies against the first amend-
ment right of association are not actionable under § 1985(c). Id. at 3358. While it does not
follow directly from Scott that § 241 is similarly limited, the decision casts doubt on whether
§ 241 will be construed to prohibit wholly private conspiracies against fourteenth amendment
rights. See Scott, 103 S. Ct. at 3357.
The second question, concerning which rights are "secured by" the Constitution and
laws of the United States, also has a volatile history. The United States Supreme Court held
in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875), that the rights "secured by" the Constitu-
tion and the laws of the United States and protected by § 241 (then § 6 of the Enforcement
Act of 1870) were only those rights that are attributes of national citizenship. The Court
suggested that these rights included the right to peaceably assemble for the purpose of peti-
tioning Congress for a redress of grievances, and the right not to be barred from voting solely
on account of race. This narrow category of rights was analogous to those protected from
governmental interference under the Court's narrow view of the privileges or immunities
clause of the fourteenth amendment, as interpreted in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36 (1873). The Court continued to limit the reach of § 241 to only this narrow class of
rights because by its terms it obviously proscribed private conspiracies, and the Court had
long since held that Congress' power under the fourteenth amendment did not reach private
action. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (1951). Thus, § 241 was limited to
protecting rights "arising from the substantive powers of the Federal Government," which
Congress could "beyond doubt constitutionally secure against interference by private individ-
uals." Id. at 73, 77.
The narrow category of rights "secured by" the Constitution or laws of the United States
was broadened to include fourteenth amendment due process rights in United States v. Price,
383 U.S. 787 (1966), and fourteenth amendment equal protection rights in United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). The Court in Price and Guest expanded the scope of the statute's
protection to its intended breadth-"anP right or privilege secured. . . by the Constitution or
laws," 18 U.S.C. § 241 (emphasis added)-without reaching the Constitutional issue of con-
gressional power to reach private action through the fifth section of the fourteenth amend-
ment, because both cases involved allegations of state action. Price, 383 U.S. at 798; Guest, 383
U.S. at 753.
125 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1982). The history of the section and its few changes are charted in an
appendix to the opinion of Justice Frankfurter in United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 83
(1951). Under United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966), and United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745 (1966), it is clear that § 241 protects the exercise of all rights secured by the Consti-
tution and all federal laws, including rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
126 In United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966), the Court detailed the history of cases
applying § 241 to punish private conspirators. Price and United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745
(1966), expanded the reach of the statute to protection of fourteenth amendment rights. See
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the elements of the crime become readily apparent. Two or more per-
sons must: (1) conspire, or go in disguise on the highway or on the prem-
ises of another, (2) in order to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate a
citizen, (3) with a specific intent to interfere with a federal right defined
by decision or other rule of law. 12 7 Although the federal rights protected
by section 241 are all those rights secured by the Constitution or the
laws of the United States, 128 the rights so secured must be within the
power of Congress to protect from interference by the defendant. For
example, if the defendant acted in a wholly private capacity, the federal
right relied upon must be one that Congress can constitutionally protect
from interference by private individuals. 129
Recent cases applying section 241 illustrate how the statute may be
used to punish racially motivated acts of private violence and intimida-
tion. In United States v. Kilgore, 130 a young black man and his white wife,
residents of Tennessee, were victims of an unprovoked attack while driv-
ing through Alabama. A carload of four white men assaulted the couple
and battered the husband with rocks and bricks, injuring him
supra note 124. Guest also held that § 241 protects the right of interstate travel. The earlier
cases holding § 241 applicable are: United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (right to
vote in federal elections); In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 (1895) (right to inform of violations of
federal law); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892) (right to be secure from unauthor-
ized violence while in federal custody); United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76 (1884) (right to
perfect a homestead claim). Viewing this "narrow and relatively unimportant category of
rights" previously protected by § 241, and reviewing the legislative history of the section (see
Price, 383 U.S. at 807-20 for the remarks of Senator Pool, the sponsor of the section), the
Court in Price rejected the former, narrow interpretation of the statute and held it applicable
to all rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.
127 In Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), the Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 242
(1982), a criminal statute analogous to § 241, but including an "under color of law" limita-
tion, was not unconstitutionally vague. The Court in Screws construed the word "willfully" in
§ 242 narrowly, and required "an intent to deprive a person of a right which has been made
specific either by the express terms of the Constitution or laws of the United States or by
decisions interpreting them." 325 U.S. at 104. Acting "willfully" in this sense means acting
"in open defiance or in reckless disregard of a constitutional requirement which has been
made specific and definite." Id. at 105.
In Guest, the Court applied the same "strict scienter" requirement to violations of § 241,
noting that "the gravamen of the offense is conspiracy, [therefore] the requirement that the
offender must act with a specific intent to interfere with the federal rights in question is
satisfied." 383 U.S. at 753-54.
128 United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966); see supra note 124.
129 See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745
(1966); see also supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text. The Court has not yet decided
whether § 241 protects fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection rights from
wholly private interference. See Guest, 383 U.S. at 781-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part);
supra note 124. For a discussion of the particular rights traditionally protected by § 241
against private interference, see Feuerstein, Civil Rights Crimes and the Federal Power To Punish
Pivate Individuals for Interference With Federally Secured Rights, 19 VAND. L. REv. 641 (1966).
130 Indictment, No. 81C 27-M (N.D. Ala. Feb. 6, 1981).
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seriously.131
The four defendants were charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 241
by conspiring to "injure, oppress, threaten and intimidate" the young
couple "in the free exercise and enjoyment of the right" to interstate
travel. 3 2 Three of the defendants pled guilty to the charge; the other
was convicted. 33
The second count of the indictment charged the defendants with
violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 2(a)134 and 245(b)(2)(E)135 by aiding and abet-
ting each other to "willfully injure, intimidate and interfere with" the
complainant, "because of his race and color," and because he was trav-
eling in interstate commerce. 36 The same three defendants pled guilty
to this second charge, and the other was convicted. 3 7
In United States v. Bishop,138 five Klansmen planned to kill one black
man for moving into a "white" neighborhood, and to kill another for
frequenting a "white" bar.'39 The first attack was called off,' 40 but the
second resulted in two attempts to shoot the victim, first as he left the
bar, and again when he arrived home.' 4'
In connection with the aborted attack, two of the defendants were
convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 241 by conspiring to "injure, oppress,
threaten and intimidate" a citizen "in the free exercise and enjoyment of
the right" to "hold property and to occupy a dwelling without injury,
intimidation, or interference" because of race or color. 142 Three of the
131 When the black man asked why he was being attacked, one of the defendants replied
that it was because he was with a white girl. See infia notes 191-96 and accompanying text
for discussion of a later civil suit arising out of this incident.
132 Kilgore, indictment at 1. For the full text of § 241, see supra note 124. That § 241
protects the right to engage in interstate travel free of private interference was established in
United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
133 Telephone interview, supra note 4.
134 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1976) provides: "Whoever commits an offense against the United
States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as
a principal."
135 18 U.S.C. § 245 enumerates a host of "federally protected activities." See infra note 161
for full text of the relevant sections of the statute.
136 Kilgore, indictment at 3.
137 Telephone interview, supra note 4. The convicted conspirator appealed the decision,
but the appeal was dismissed in favor of the United States. The other three defendants were
first given sentences of several years, which were subsequently reduced to a few months. Id.
138 Indictment, No. 80-80536 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 10, 1980).
139 United States v. Bishop, sentencing memorandum, No. 80-80536 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 31,
1980). The defendants also intended to kill the white bartender because he was "friends"
with the black man. Id. at 2, 5.
140 Bishop, indictment at 3-5; Bishop, sentencing memorandum at 1. The attack was
averted only because the "hit" man changed his mind, and local police had been warned of
the plan. Bishop, sentencing memorandum at 4.
141 Bishop, sentencing memorandum at 3; Bishop, indictment at 2-3.
142 Bishop, indictment at 3-5 (Count 4). The first planned attack still constituted a conspir-
acy in violation of§ 241, though it was never carried out. One defendant received a four-year
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defendants were also convicted of violating section 241 by conspiring to
injure the victim of the attempted shooting in "the free exercise and
enjoyment" of his right to "full and equal use of a place of public ac-
commodation without discrimination on the basis of race, color, reli-
gion, or national origin ....
In United States v. Redwine, 144 three defendants were convicted of vi-
olating section 241 by conspiring to "injure, oppress, threaten or intimi-
date" a black family in the free exercise of its right to occupy a dwelling
without interference because of race. 145 The defendants had harassed
the family for moving into an all-white neighborhood by throwing rocks
and bottles through the windows, shouting racial epithets, and finally
firebombing the home.' 46 That the defendants may not have been
aware that such harassment constituted interference with a federally
protected right was held not to bar prosecution under section 241.147
Kilgore, Bishop, and Redwine demonstrate that section 241 can reach
many private acts of racially motivated violence. The Kilgore indictment
relied on the implied constitutional right of free interstate travel, long
protected against interference by governmental action, but also held to
be a right protected against private interference in United States v.
Guest .148 The constitutional bases for the enforcement of section 241 in
sentence to be served concurrently with his sentence for conviction under Count 1. The other
received a one-year sentence. D. Nesselson, Klan Related Litigation 2 (Feb. 1981) (unpub-
lished memorandum).
143 Bishop, indictment at I (Count 1). The language quoted here substantially tracks the
language in § 201 of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, guaranteeing the right of equal
access to places of public accommodation. Thus, rights that become established in the federal
law ("made definite") also become cognizable under, and therefore protected by, § 241, as it
"embraces all of the rights and privileges secured to citizens by all of the Constitution and all
of the laws of the United States." United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 800 (1966) (emphasis
in original). Two of the defendants received four-year sentences, one received a two-year sen-
tence, and one was acquitted. D. Nesselson, supra note 142, at 2.
144 715 F.2d 315 (7th Cir. 1983).
145 Id. at 318. The defendants were also convicted under 42 U.S.C. § 3631 for interference
with housing rights. See infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text for discussion of another
prosecution under § 3631. Two of the defendants in Redwine were sentenced to prison for a
total of six years each. The third defendant, a minor, was committed to the Attorney General
for supervision under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1982).
Redwine, 715 F.2d at 318-19.
146 Id. at 317-18.
147 As the court stated,
We note that while specific intent to interfere with a federally protected right must be
shown, it is not necessary that the defendant be shown to have a legalistic appreciation of
the federally protected nature of that right. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 ...
(1966). The evidence amply permits a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspir-
acy existed to intimidate the Williams family in the exercise of their right to occupy their
home, ahd that the defendants fully participated in that conspiracy.
Id. at 319-20.
148 383 U.S. 745 (1966); see Feuerstein, spra note 129, at 659-65.
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Bishop and Redwine are thirteenth amendment property rights, 49 and
public accommodations rights as established pursuant to the commerce
power.' 50 Because section 241 extends to "any right . . . secured...
by the Constitution or laws of the United States," that is, to rights
"made definite" by decision or other rule of law,' 5' the conduct that can
be prosecuted under the statute constantly expands as Congress and the
courts define new rights.' 52 Thus, the criminal penalty mandated by
section 241 will be even more useful in punishing racial violence and
intimidation as statutory and constitutional rights expand. 53
Increased enforcement of other federal criminal civil rights statutes
may also help curb the rising incidence of racial violence and intimida-
tion. These statutes were used effectively in United States v. Johns154 to
punish ten Klansmen and associates for three racially motivated violent
attacks. The defendants fired shotguns into the home of two racially
149 These rights stem from part of § 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act (currently 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1982 (1976)) as interpreted in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968),
and Title IX of the 1968 Civil Rights Act (The Fair Housing Act), 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (1976).
150 See supra note 143. Congress based the public accommodations provisions of the 1964
Civil Rights Act on the commerce power.
151 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1982); see supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
152 See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, No. 80-80536 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 10, 1980) (using the
public accommodations right established in the 1964 Civil Rights Act to invoke § 241);
United States v. Redwine, 715 F.2d 315 (7th Cir. 1983) (using the right to equal housing
opportunity established by the 1968 Civil Rights Act to invoke § 241). Because § 241 is a
felony provision, it carries far stiffer penalties than those usually available for enforcement
under the statutes creating these federal rights. See supra note 124 for text of § 241.
153 This aspect of § 241 offers the greatest potential for expanded protection of citizens
from racially motivated acts of violence and intimidation. Under a theory of national citizen-
ship, in which the federal government is considered the primary guarantor of all fundamental
rights of citizens, the protection of§ 241 would extend to all threats to life, liberty, and prop-
erty, both from the state and from private individuals. See generaly R. NEWMAN & C. NEW-
MAN, THE ROLE OF LAW IN SOCIETY (1958); Newman, A Forgotten Right of United States
Citizenship, 39 ILL. L. REV. 367 (1945). Under this view, federal enforcement of fundamen-
tal rights would be used only when state protection is inadequate, but this limitation would,
of course, be voluntary.
Another possible theory the Supreme Court could adopt is that the privileges or immuni-
ties clause of the fourteenth amendment comprises the fundamental rights of citizens. Under
such an expanded view of the clause, the question of Congressional power to enforce four-
teenth amendment rights against private interference would again possibly limit the reach of
§ 241. See supra note 124. Assuming the Court would also uphold such congressional power
under the fifth section of the fourteenth amendment, § 241 could presumably again reach all
threats to life, liberty, and property.
If either of these constitutional views were adopted, the rather broad reach of § 241
could be limited to areas in which the federal government has a legitimate interest, and in
which state protection is demonstrably deficient. Thus, amendment of the statute to require a
racial or religious motivation on the part of the perpetrator of the crime could provide a limit
to its protection, while insuring that acts of racial violence and intimidation do not go unpun-
ished simply because no adequate basis of federal jurisdiction exists under present interpreta-
tions of the statute and the Constitution.
154 615 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1980).
COMMENTS [Vol. 75
mixed couples, and the homes of two local NAACP leaders. 155
Four defendants were convicted of violating the Fair Housing
Act 156 and of conspiring with three others to violate the Act 157 by firing
into the home of the couples. 158 The Fair Housing Act protects an indi-
vidual's right to live in any home regardless of race. Although the
Klansmen's primary motive in the attack was to discourage the couples
from continuing their interracial relationships,159 the jury injohns found
that another motive was to end interracial cohabitation in the
dwelling. 160
Eight defendants were convicted of violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 245(b)(5),' 6 ' and for conspiring to violate the same, 162 by firing into
the homes of the NAACP leaders. The defendants intended to discour-
155 Id. at 674.
156 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (1976) provides in part:
Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, by force or threat of force willfully
injures, intimidates or interferes with, or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere
with-
(a) any person because of his race. . . and because he is or has been. . . occupy-
ing.. .any dwelling. . . shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both ....
Section 3631 not only provides broad protection for minorities' housing rights, but protects
landlords who rent to them as well. For an excellent discussion of a recent conviction under
§ 3631 for racially-motivated harassment of a landlord and his black tenant, see Harrington
& Johnson, Get Rid of the Niggerr, 38 GUILD PRAc. 33 (1981).
157 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982) (general conspiracy statute) provides:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United
States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any
purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspir-
acy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a
misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum
punishment provided for such misdemeanor.
158 Johns, 615 F.2d at 674.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 675. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, upholding all the
convictions on appeal, stated that "[tihe legislative history accompanying 42 U.S.C. § 3631
and 18 U.S.C. § 245(b) indicates a clear congressional intent to impose criminal sanctions on
persons who engage in the conduct appellants were found to have participated in and with
the intent appellants were found to have had." Id.
161 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1982) provides in part:
(b) Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, by force or threat of force
willfully injures, intimidates or interferes with, or attempts to injure, intimidate or inter-
fere with-
(2) any person because of his race, color, religion or national origin and because
he is or has been-
(A) enrolling in or attending any public school or public college;
(B) participating in or enjoying any benefit, service, privilege, program, facility
or activity provided or administered by any State or subdivision thereof;
(C) applying for or enjoying employment, or any perquisite thereof, by any
private employer or any agency of any State or subdivision thereof, or joining or
1984] RA CIALL Y-MO TIVA TED VIOLENCE
age the NAACP's efforts to secure better employment opportunities for
local blacks, an activity protected from private interference by section
245.163 All ten defendants received sentences of two to four years. 64
using the services or advantages of any labor organization, hiring hall, or employ-
ment agency;
(D) serving, or attending upon any court of any State in connection with possi-
ble service, as a grand or petit juror;
(E) traveling in or using any facility of interstate commerce, or using any vehi-
cle, terminal, or facility of any common carrier by motor, rail, water, or air;
(F) enjoying the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommo-
dations of any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to
transient guests, or of any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda
fountain, or other facility which serves the public and which is principally engaged
in selling food or beverages for consumption on the premises, or of any gasoline
station, or of any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium,
or any other place of exhibition or entertainment which serves the public, or of any
other establishment which serves the public and (i) which is located within the
premises of any of the aforesaid establishments or within the premises of which is
physically located any of the aforesaid establishments, and (ii) which holds itself out
as serving patrons of such establishments; or
(4) any person because he is or has been, or in order to intimidate such person or
any other person or any class of persons from-
(A) participating, without discrimination on account of race, color, religion or
national origin, in any of the benefits or activities described in subparagraphs (1)(A)
through (1)(E) or subparagraphs (2)(A) through (2)(F); or
(B) affording another person or class of persons opportunity or protection to so
participate; or
(5) any citizen because he is or has been, or in order to intimidate such citizen or
any other citizen from lawfully aiding or encouraging other persons to participate,
without discrimination on account of race, color, religion or national origin, in any of
the benefits or activities described in subparagraphs (1)(A) through (1)(E) or subpara-
graphs (2) (A) through (2) (F), or participating lawfully in speech or peaceful assembly
opposing any denial of the opportunity to so participate-
shall'be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and
if bodily injury results shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than
ten years, or both; and if death results shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of
years or for life.
162 See supra note 157 for text of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982).
163 Johns, 615 F.2d at 676; 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(C); see also supra note 160. Because § 245
specifically enumerates the federal rights it protects and carries a sliding scale of penalties, it
is an excellent prosecutorial tool for punishing private racial violence and intimidation in
many circumstances. Some recent successful prosecutions under it include: United States v.
Creekmore, No. CR80AO0012NW (N.D. Ala. Feb. 19, 1980) (two black ministers attacked by
two white men outside a public restaurant); United States v. Brown, No. 79-H-296 (N.D. Ala.
Jan. 15, 1980) (Vietnamese refugees threatened at knifepoint and told to leave their jobs by
Klan officer); and United States v. Franklin, No. CR-80-125J (D. Utah Mar. 23, 1981) (two
black men murdered while jogging with two white women in a city park).
The narrow language of § 245 is also often a detriment to federal prosecution. The de-
fendant in Franklin was the same man who had earlier shot Vernon Jordan, then President of
the National Urban League, outside a Fort Wayne, Indiana hotel in 1980. Franklin was also
prosecuted for that crime in 1982, under § 245, but was acquitted. Although the jury was
apparently convinced that Franklin shot Jordan, it was not convinced that he did so because
Jordan was enjoying the services of the hotel. Telephone interview, supra note 4. The nine
former Klansmen and Nazis prosecuted under § 245 for killing five communist demonstrators
in Greensboro, North Carolina in 1979 were also acquitted. See supra note 96. Racial or
religious motivation must be shown for an offense to be cognizable under § 245. The Greens-
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Kigore, Bishop, Redwine, and Johns illustrate the versatility and
breadth of the federal criminal civil rights statutes. These laws are espe-
cially well-adapted for the kind of organized conspiracies that character-
ize the terroristic activities of violent extremist groups. 16 5 In view of the
increasing rise in violence directed at racial and religious minorities,1 6 6
the inadequacies of state legislation, 67 and the tendency of local juries
to become less likely to convict guilty defendants during periods of ra-
cial tension, 68 the United States Department of Justice should prose-
cute more vigorously the perpetrators of racial and religious violence,
and seek to expand present court interpretations of private conduct pro-
hibited by these statutes. 169
The procedure followed by the Department of Justice in enforcing
the criminal civil rights statutes has been to investigate occurrences of
racial or religious violence.' 70 When a decision is made to prosecute at
the local level, the Department usually defers action, and awaits the
outcome of the state trial.' 71 This "waiting period" is at least several
months, and often a year or more. If the perpetrators of a serious racial
crime are acquitted, or are convicted but given lenient or suspended
boro federal jury apparently felt that the defendants went to the anti-Klan rally and attacked
the victims only because of the victims' communist political beliefs. Hirsley, Prosecutors Blamed
for Acquittal in Klan-Nazi Attack, Chicago Tribune, April 22, 1984, at 5, col. 1.
164 D. Nesselson, supra note 142, at 1.
165 This is due to the origins of § 241; as § 6 of the Enforcement Act of 1870, the statute
was specifically directed at the activities of the Reconstruction Era Ku Klux Klan and similar
groups.
166 See supra notes 1-13 and accompanying text.
167 See supra notes 33-81 and accompanying text.
168 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
169 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
170 Increasing Violence, supra note 1, at 90-94, 103-04 (statement of Drew S. Days III). The
Department carries out its investigations in cooperation with local law enforcement agencies.
171 Id. at 91, 93-94 (statement of Drew S. Days III), 117-18 (statement of Althea T.L.
Simmons, Director, Washington Bureau, NAACP). This "wait and see" policy apparently
has reasserted itself in full force. The Department of Justice policy prior to 1977 concerning
dual prosecutions of an individual for the same act was to defer to the state investigation and
prosecution and to proceed only when the conduct involved was particularly egregious and
elicited intense public outrage. Id. at 28, 32 (referring to the circumstances of United States
v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966)). A new policy was instituted under Attorney General Griffin
Bell in 1977 that mandated consideration of each criminal civil rights violation on its own
merits, "regardless of whatever related enforcement action has been taken by the states."
Memorandum to All United States Attorneys, Dual Prosecution Polily in Cases Involving Viola-
tions of Civil Rights, from Griffin B. Bell, Attorney General (July 12, 1977), reprinted in Increas-
ing Violence ,supra note 1, at 121. By 1980, it was apparent that the Department was not living
up to its stated objective and was still deferring to local proceedings, taking action only when
local prosecutors failed to produce adequate results. Increasing Violence, supra note 1, at 118
(statement of Althea T.L. Simmons). By 1983, consideration of the adequacy of a state prose-
cution for racial violence was no longer considered irrelevant to the question of proceeding
with a federal prosecution. Such consideration had become an integral part of the decision
whether to prosecute federally. Telephone interview, supra note 4; see infra note 173.
[Vol. 75
1984] RACIALL Y-MOTIVA TED VIOLENCE
sentences, the Department will assess its chances of success, weighing the
evidence and the claim of federal jurisdiction, 172 and then decide
whether to convene a grand jury.173 Indictments and eventually convic-
tions may be secured, perhaps as long as three or four years after the
crime has been committed.' 74
This system has failed adequately to deter and punish racially mo-
tivated violence. The Department of Justice should not defer to state
prosecutions when it has an adequate basis for proceeding immedi-
ately. 175 Convening a federal grand jury soon after outbreaks of racial
violence in an area can have a strong deterrent effect on future vio-
172 That is, the Department determines whether the conduct involved is cognizable under
one or more of the federal criminal civil rights statutes. See, e.g., supra note 124.
173 The Department of Justice presently employs three criteria in determining whether to
prosecute in a criminal civil rights case:
(1) The meeting of the relatively narrow jurisdictional requirements of one or more fed-
eral criminal civil rights statutes;
(2) The likelihood of conviction ofthe accused (ie., is the accused the actual perpetrator
of the crime);
(3) The action taken at the state level. Was there a state prosecution? If there was, what
was the result, both as to the verdict and the sentence, if any? Was the sentence ade-
quate in view of the seriousness of the crime?
Telephone interview, supra note 4.
Dual prosecution in general is disfavored by the Department as a matter of policy. How-
ever, the standard for going ahead with an additional prosecution is somewhat lower in the
civil rights area. Telephone interview, supra note 4.
t74 The Greensboro killings, see supra text accompanying note 2, took place in November
1979. The unsuccessful state criminal prosecution ended a year later, in November 1980. The
Justice Department initially claimed, in December 1980, that there was no basis for federal
jurisdiction; that is, that no rights cognizable under the federal criminal civil rights statutes
had been violated. Pressure for federal intervention continued to mount. In May 1981, the
U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of North Carolina made public his recommendation
that federal civil rights prosecutions be brought against the Klan and Nazi killers. In March
1982, a federal grand jury was impanelled. One year later, in April of 1983, three and one-
half years after the Greensboro shootings, the grand jury finally handed down federal indict-
ments. See supra note 96. The federal trial was not concluded until April 1984. Se supra note
163.
In most instances, obtaining indictments and convictions under federal civil rights stat-
utes does not take so long, as federal authorities are usually quick to prosecute when it is
apparent that no state prosecution is forthcoming. When federal officials defer to a state
prosecution and await its outcome, however, the dangerous perception of a weak and ineffec-
tual governmental response arises and exacerbates an already tense situation. See general In-
creasing Violence, supra note 1, at 93-94, 95-98; Charns, supra note 2, at 9, col. 1. When a state
prosecution fails to convict or adequately sentence defendants in racial violence and intimida-
tion cases, violent extremist groups claim victory and "vindication" of their actions and ideas.
Several of the defendants acquitted in the Greensboro state prosecution have since become
heroes of Klan-Nazi society, and now frequently appear as speakers at rallies. A History of
Racism and Violence, supra note 1, at 50.
175 That the Justice Department has the constitutional authority to proceed with a federal
prosecution is clear. See supra text accompanying note 119. The present "wait and see" policy
is antithetical to the Department's duty to enforce the federal criminal law. Although inade-
quacy of local law enforcement was certainly a primary reason for the original enactment of
§ 241 (see United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 810-19 (1966) (appendix to the opinion of the
COMMENTS
lence. t76 If the state also prosecutes the offenders, the deterrent effect is
even greater, but state prosecution does not relieve federal officials of
their responsibility to enforce federal law. American history, from the
Reconstruction Era to the Civil Rights Movement, indicates that the
federal government has of necessity become the primary guarantor of
individual civil rights, 17 7 especially the right to be free of injury or in-
timidation because of one's race or religion. Responsibility rests, there-
fore, on the federal government to prosecute actively all acts of racial
and religious violence and intimidation that are subject to federal
jurisdiction.
B. RECENT CIVIL CASES UNDER FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES
The power of the criminal civil rights statutes to deter racial vio-
lence and harassment is of course limited; the statutes can only punish
the perpetrators of harm after-the-fact, and can only be enforced by the
federal government, not by private parties. Suits brought by private
plaintiffs under the civil sections of the federal civil rights acts can pre-
vent racial violence, 178 enjoin racial harassment, 179 or compensate the
victims of racial violence and intimidation.1
8 0
The primary federal civil statute for rectifying civil rights interfer-
ence by private individuals is 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c),' 8 ' which grants a pri-
vate right of action to any person deprived "of the equal protection of
the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws" by pri-
Court, containing the remarks of Senator Pool, the sponsor of § 241)), Congress simply did not
make it an element of the § 241 offense.
176 Increasing Violence, supra note 1, at 29.
177 Congress, in enacting the Reconstruction Era civil rights statutes, made the federal
courts "thepima,7 and powerful reliances for vindicating every right given by the Constitu-
tion, the laws, and treaties of the United States." Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 464
(1974) (emphasis in original); cf. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1972) ("[a]s a
result of the new structure of law that emerged in the post-Civil War era ... the role of the
Federal Government as a guarantor of basic federal rights against state power was clearly
established').
178 See in/ia notes 197-212 and accompanying text.
179 See in/a notes 229-32 and accompanying text.
180 See infa notes 191-96 and accompanying text; see alro infa note 233.
181 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) was formerly designated § 1985(3). It provides in part:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the high-
way or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving. . . any person or class
of persons. . . of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities
under the laws;. . . [and] if one or more [conspirators]. . . does. . . any act in further-
ance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or prop-
erty, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages
occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
Section 1985(c) is derived from part of§ 2 of the 1871 Civil Rights Act, also known as the Ku
Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13-14 (1871).
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vate conspirators.'1 2 The elements of a cause of action under section
1985(c), as outlined by the United States Supreme Court in GriFln v.
Breckenn'dge,18 3 are: (1) the defendants "'must conspire or go in disguise
on the highway or on the premises of another,' (2) 'for the purpose of
depriving. . . any person or class of persons of the equal protection of
the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws,'" (3) the
defendants must act in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy,
whereby (4) another is (a) injured in person or property, or (b) "'de-
prived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States.' ",184
As interpreted by the Court in 6rzz, "intent to deprive of equal
protection, or equal privileges and immunities, means that there must be
some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discrimina-
tory animus behind the conspirators' action."' 85 As with 18 U.S.C.
§ 241,186 the rights allegedly violated by the defendant in a section
1985(c) suit must be those within the power of Congress to protect from
private interference.18 7
Since the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of section 1985(c)
182 See supra note 181.
183 403 U.S. 88 (1971). In Gnif, the Court expanded the formerly narrow reach of
§ 1985(c) as interpreted in earlier cases. See, e.g., Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1950).
In rejecting its earlier approach, which in effect had placed a "state action" limitation on the
statute, see Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement
Clauses of the Reconstntion Era Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 449, 495-96 (1974), the Court
in Giint held § 1985(c) applied to private conspiracies. But to limit the reach of the broad
language of the statute, the Court interpreted the "purpose of depriving. . .any person. . .
of the equal protection of the laws" language in the statute to mean that "there must be some
racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the con-
spirators' action." 403 U.S. at 102. Because the Grftn plaintiffs suffered deprivations of thir-
teenth amendment rights and the right of interstate travel, the Court did not decide whether
the statute reached wholly private conspiracies against fourteenth amendment rights. Thus,
the Court in Gjiz also did not consider whether Congress has power to reach private action
under section five of the fourteenth amendment. 403 U.S. at 105-06.
184 Griffk, 403 U.S. at 102-03 (quoting petitioners' complaint).
185 Id. at 102 (emphasis in original). In United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America, Local 610 v. Scott, 103 S. Ct. 3352 (1983), the United States Supreme Court held
that § 1985(c) does not reach wholly private conspiracies against fourteenth amendment
rights. Thus, to be cognizable under § 1985(c), a conspiracy against the exercise of first
amendment rights (or other rights applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of
the fourteenth amendment) must involve state officials or an attempt "to influence the activ-
ity of the state." Id. at 3357. The Court in Scott also ostensibly declined to further clarify
Gnln's requirement of class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus, but held that the re-
quirement was not met where the conspiracy was motivated by "economic or commercial
animus." Id. at 3360. While the Court in Scott did hold that § 1985(c) does not itself protect
fourteenth amendment rights from wholly private interference, it did not indicate that Con-
gress does not have the power to protect fourteenth amendment rights against private inter-
ference under the fifth section of that amendment. Id. at 3357-58. See supra note 124.
186 See supra text accompanying notes 124-29.
187 Grzn
'
m, 403 U.S. at 104; see supra notes 124, 185.
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in Gnin,188 the number of suits brought under it by racial minorities
and others has greatly increased.1 89 Because section 1985(c) was
designed to provide a remedy for private violence and intimidation by
the Ku Klux Klan in the Reconstruction Era, it is well-suited to re-
dressing the private racially motivated violence that has continued into
the 1980's. 190
In Adams v. Kigore, 191 a civil suit based on the assault of a black
man and his white wife in Alabama, the plaintiffs sought damages and
injunctive relief. The complaint alleged causes of action based on, inter
alia, section 1985(c), and the thirteenth amendment. 92 With regard to
the section 1985(c) cause of action, the plaintiffs alleged that the four
defendants had conspired, and overtly acted, to deprive them of the
equal protection of the laws and of equal privileges and immunities
under the laws, by acting out of a racial animus "against blacks, and
against all blacks and whites who desire to live [together] free of
segregation."193
The constitutional bases for the application of section 1985(c) to
the private attack on the married couple were the plaintiffs' thirteenth
amendment right to be free from the badges and incidents of slavery,
and the freedom of interstate travel.194 The district court sustained the
section 1985(c) cause of action, and a jury awarded the plaintiffs $5000
188 See supra note 183.
189 See generally Comment, A Construction of Section 1985(c) in Light of Its Original Purpose, 46
U. CHI. L. REV. 402 (1979); Note, Protection of Religious Group Members Under 42 USC
§ 1985(c), 39 WAsiH. & LEE L. REv. 555, 555 n.3 (1982).
190 The statute is well-suited to this end because of its broad language, and because the
goals and methods of the Klan and other violent extremist groups are essentially the same as
they were during the Reconstruction Era.
191 Complaint, No. 81P 224-M (N.D. Ala. Feb. 13, 1981). This civil case arose from the
same events described in United States v. Kilgore, No. 81C 27-M, (N.D. Ala. Feb. 6, 1981). See
supra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
192 Among the other causes of action was one based on 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1976), which
provides in part:
Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and
mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are about to be committed, and having power to
prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if
such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to the party injured, or his legal repre-
sentatives, for all damages caused by such wrongful act, which such person by reasonable
diligence could have prevented ....
The statute is derived from § 6 of the 1871 Civil Rights Act, ch. 22, § 6, 17 Stat. 15 (1871).
The statute creates an inherent second cause of action against every conspirator, as each
necessarily knows of the acts "to be committed," and could prevent their occurrence by, for
example, contacting the police.
193 Adams, complaint at 5. The object of the conspiracy was to threaten and physically
attack the plaintiffs so as to force them to leave the area. Id. at 4, 5.
194 Id. at 4-6.
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in compensatory damages. 95
Perhaps the best example of the power of these Reconstruction Era
civil rights statutes to combat the violence and intimidation of racist
groups can be found in a case arising from a recent confrontation on the
Texas Gulf Coast. In Vietnamese Fisherman's Association v. Knights of the Ku
Klux Klan (I),196 American fishermen, alarmed by a growing influx of
refugee Vietnamese fishermen, asked the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan
for assistance. 97 The Klan held a rally in support of the American fish-
ermen, at which the Grand Dragon of the Texas Klan, and leader of its
"Texas Emergency Reserve" paramilitary wing, demonstrated how to
burn a boat. He also offered to train interested American fishermen in
his military camps.' 98 Soon after, several armed and robed Klansmen
went on a "boat ride," brandishing their weapons and intimidating the
Vietnamese fishermen. 99 Numerous other acts of intimidation oc-
curred, including threatening phone calls, personal harassment, and the
burning of Vietnamese boats.2°°
The plaintiff class of Vietnamese fishermen sought to enjoin the
defendants from engaging in acts of violence or intimidation, relying on,
inter alia,20 1 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,202 1985(c), and 1986,203 the thirteenth
and fourteenth amendments, and a Texas statute forbidding the forma-
tion of private armies. 20 4 The district court held that the plaintiffs had
demonstrated a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits under
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985(c), and 1986, and on other claims. 20 5 Having
thus found that the circumstances warranted injunctive relief, the court
195 Telephone interview with John Furman, Research Director of the Southern Poverty
Law Center, Montgomery, Alabama (Mar. 8, 1983).
196 518 F. Supp. 993 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
197 I d at 1001.
198 Id.
'99 Id. at 1002.
200 See id. at 1001-06.
201 The plaintiffs also alleged claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976); the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1, 15, 21, and 26 (1982); the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962 and 1964 (1982); and the common law torts of assault, trespass to
personal property, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and intentional interference
with contractual relations. 518 F. Supp. at 999-1000.
202 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence,
and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons
and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment,
pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
The statute is derived from § 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 1 ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
203 For text of § 1986, see supra note 192.
204 518 F. Supp. at 999-1000.
205 Id. at 1016. The court also sustained the claims made under the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1, and the common law tort of tortious interference with contractual relations. Id.
1984]
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granted a preliminary injunction against the defendant Ku Klux Klan,
enjoining it from interfering with or intimidating the plaintiff class of
Vietnamese fishermen.20 6
To establish a violation of section 1985(c), the plaintiffs had to
prove that the defendants conspired to deprive them of the equal protec-
tion of the laws.2 0 7 Under the Fifth Circuit interpretation of Griffin v.
Breckenridge ,208 this required a finding that the "actions of the defend-
ants' conspiracy. . . demonstrate a violation of some law, independent
of [section 1985(c)]." 20 9 Relying on the defendants' violation of section
1981,210 an independent law, the plaintiffs demonstrated a substantial
likelihood of success as to the claimed violation of section 1985(c).2 11
In Vietnamese Fishermen's Association v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan
(II),2 12 the plaintiff Vietnamese fishermen obtained an injunction
against all Klan paramilitary operations in Texas. The defendant
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan had been operating four paramilitary
training camps in the state under the name of the "Texas Emergency
206 Id. at 1016-17.
207 The court proceeded under the "equal protection of the laws" provision, and not the
"equal privileges and immunities" clause of the statute, id. at 1006, noting Fifth Circuit au-
thority for the proposition that the latter clause did not apply to aliens. See United States v.
Biloxi Municipal School District, 219 F. Supp. 691, afd, 326 F.2d 237 (5th Cir. 1963).
208 403 U.S. 88 (1971); see supra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
209 Id. at 1006. The necessity of proving this "fifth element" to sustain a cause of action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(c) is an innovation introduced by the Fifth Circuit in McLellan v.
Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1977) (en bane). The addition of this
element limits the newly expanded scope of § 1985(c) established in Griffin v. Breckenridge,
403 U.S. 88 (1971), discussed supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text. For criticism of the
Fifth Circuit's approach, see Case Comment, Private Conspiracies to Violate Civil Rights: MeLel-
Ian v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 90 HARV. L. REV. 1721, 1729 (1977) (the Fifth Cir-
cuit's approach is criticized as "an insensitive attempt to contain the statute which
overreaches the purpose of such a limitation and inhibits the statute's protection of important
individual rights").
210 Section 1981 protects the right of all persons to make and enforce contracts. See supra
note 202. The defendants' threatening activities had interfered with the ability of the
Vietnamese fishermen to make and enforce contracts with dock owners. 518 F. Supp. at 1008.
211 518 F. Supp. at 1016. Having demonstrated that the defendants had violated
§ 1985(c), the plaintiffs were then able to show that the defendants also violated § 1986 by
failing to prevent the intimidation that violated § 1985(c). See supra note 192 for the text of
§ 1986, which grants a private right of action against anyone who, having the power or au-
thority to do so, knowingly fails to prevent the commission of an act that violates § 1985.
The preliminary injunction against the Klan, issued six hours before the start of the
Galveston shrimping season, brought peace to the Kemah-Seabrook area. However, the dis-
trict court refused to enjoin the Klan's paramilitary camps in Texas without opportunity for a
full hearing. Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (I), 543 F.
Supp. 198, 202 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
212 543 F. Supp. 198 (S.D. Tex. 1982). An interesting facet of the Vietnamese Fishermen's
cases was that the presiding district court judge, Gabrielle McDonald, is black. She denied
the defendants' motion requesting that she disqualify herself from hearing the case. 518 F.
Supp. 1017 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
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Reserve. ' 2 13 Trainees at the camps dressed in military uniforms, and
learned to ambush, counter-ambush, and perform reconnaissance patrol
missions.2 14 Weapons-use was taught extensively, with emphasis on au-
tomatic and semi-automatic weapons. 21 5 The "Texas Emergency Re-
serve" was directly involved in Klan intimidation of the Vietnamese
fishermen.2 16
The plaintiff class presented two grounds for an injunction against
the Klan's military activities: (1) "to remedy fully the profound depri-
vation by defendants of plaintiffs' constitutional rights, '2 17 and (2) to
enforce article 5780, section 6, of Texas Revised Civil Statutes Anno-
tated,21 8 which prohibits the formation of private armies.2 19 The court
issued a permanent injunction against the Klan's military activities on
the first ground, relying on the findings of the preliminary hearing that
had established the defendants' violation of plaintiffs' rights under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985(c), and 1986.220 The court held further that issu-
ance of the injunction did not violate the defendants' rights of free
speech and association, 22 ' nor their second amendment right to bear
arms.
222
213 543 F. Supp. 198, 203-04 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
214 Id. at 203.
215 Id. at 204. Training in biological and chemical warfare, including the use of gas masks,
was available, along with rifle practice and sniper avoidance training.
216 Id. at 206. For example, the "Texas Emergency Reserve" participated directly in the
March 1981 "boat ride." Id.
217 Id. at 202.
218 TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5780, § 6 (Vernon Supp. 1982) provides in part:
No body of men, other than the regularly organized State Military Forces of this state
and the troops of the United States, shall associate themselves together as a military
company or organization or parade in public with firearms in any city, or town of this
state ....
219 The State of Texas had joined as a party, also requesting an injunction against Klan
military operations in Texas. The court held that the State of Texas was properly before the
court and could intervene to enforce the state statute. Vietnamese Fisherman's (II), 543 F. Supp.
at 213.
220 Id. at 207, 211. The court ruled that the Texas anti-paramilitary statute was also an
adequate ground for the issuance of the injunction, holding that it completely prohibited the
formation of private armies, such as the "Texas Emergency Reserve." Id. at 198, 218. The
court held that the plaintiff class of Vietnamese fishermen had standing to enforce the Texas
statute, id. at 212, and ruled that the statute was constitutional, relying on Presser v. Illinois,
116 U.S. 252 (1886), in which the Supreme Court had upheld a similar statute as constitu-
tional. Id. at 216.
221 Id. at 208. The court quoted Presser, 116 U.S. at 267 (1886): "'Military operation and
military drill and parade under arms are subjects especially under control of the government
of every country. They cannot be claimed as a right independent of law.'" 543 F. Supp. at
209. The court also held that an injunction would be a minimal restriction on defendants'
right to free expression: "defendants remain free to express their views by means other than
the threat of military force."
222 Id. at 210. Quoting from the second amendment, the court ruled that it "prohibits only
such infringement on the bearing of weapons as would interfere with 'the preservation or
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The court's finding that the injunction could be granted solely on
the basis of the defendants' deprivation of the plaintiffs' civil rights,
without resort to the state statute prohibiting private armies, is espe-
cially important. Although twenty-four other states have anti-paramili-
tary laws, 223 Klan paramilitary training is already occurring in states
that do not have such laws. 224 The court stated that equitable princi-
ples dictated that an injunction issue against the "Texas Emergency Re-
serve" because "it is the [Texas Emergency Reserve] which enables the
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and those who conspire with them, to
perpetuate their threats of intimidation and violence toward the plain-
tiff class and provide[s] the wherewithal to carry out those threats. ' 225
As the court noted, the Klan paramilitary phenomenon is a nationwide
problem. 226 When private military organizations seek to interfere by
force with the civil rights of minority citizens, such inherently dangerous
activities must be enjoined.22 7
The civil remedy provided by section 1985(c) has been invoked re-
cently to protect the first amendment right of minorities to engage in
demonstrations or protest marches. Southern Christian Leadership Conference
v. The Invisible Empire, Knghts of the Ku Klux Klan2 2 8 is a class action
lawsuit currently being brought on behalf of all Alabama blacks that
seeks to recover $43 million in damages from the nation's largest Klan
organization and to enjoin it from interfering with the federally pro-
tected rights of the class.22 9 The case is based on terrorist activities car-
ried out against blacks in Decatur, Alabama that culminated in a
violent attack on peaceful protesters in May 1979.230 The plaintiffs as-
efficiency of a well regulated militia,' organized by the State." Id. The State of Texas, then,
in the absence of federal preemption, was the sole judge of the proper means to maintain its
militia and it had by statute prohibited private armies. See supra notes 218-19.
223 See supra note 22.
224 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
225 Vietnamese Fishermen's (II), 543 F. Supp. at 210-11.
226 Id. Relying on Vietnamese Fishermen's (II) and an Alabama statute similar to the Texas
statute invoked here, Klanwatch attorneys have recently succeeded in obtaining an injunc-
tion against Klan paramilitary activity in Alabama. Paramilitay Unit of KKK ir Banned by
Judge, POVERTY L. REP., Feb. 1984, at 1.
227 The concern of the Vietnamese Fishermen's (II) court for the threat presented by such
Klan activities is clear from its conclusion:
The existence of Klan sponsored military organizations which train people in the use of
violence presents a new and more serious threat to individuals' civil rights. Regardless of
whether it is called defense training or survival courses, it is clear to this Court that the
proliferation of military/paramilitary organizations can only serve to sow the seeds of
future domestic violence and tragedy.
543 F. Supp. at 219.
228 Amended complaint, No. 80-HM-1449-S (N.D. Ala. Oct. 19, 1983).
229 Southern Christian Leadership Conference, amended complaint at 2, 8.
230 The People's Association of Decatur, a civil rights and equal opportunity organization
of blacks in the Decatur area, began a series of lawful marches and rallies to protest the arrest
[Vol. 75
1984] RA CIALL Y-MOTIVA TED VIOLENCE
sert causes of action based on sections 1981, 1985(c), and 1986, together
with claims based directly on constitutional provisions and tort
claims. 23 1
Adams and Vietnamese Fishermen-' are excellent illustrations of the
broad preventive and compensatory powers of the Reconstruction Era
civil rights acts. Wider recognition and employment of these civil reme-
dies is needed to help curb outbreaks of racial violence. A movement in
this direction has begun, but it must be strengthened if these civil stat-
utes are to provide a credible deterrent to racial violence and intimida-
tion.232 One long-ignored alternative is for the Department of Justice to
bring broad-based injunctive suits against the violent activities of groups
motivated by racial and religious hatred. This technique was developed
in the 1960's to combat the Ku Klux Klan's intense resistance to the civil
and conviction of a mentally retarded black man for the alleged rape of three white women in
1978. The scope of the protests was gradually broadened to other grievances, including une-
qual treatment in education, law enforcement, housing, and employment. The Klan began a
sporadic series of cross-burnings and rallies, gun parades, and violent attacks that continued
until May 1979. On May 26, the anniversary of the arrest, about 100 Klansmen armed with
guns, clubs, and iron pipes broke through a line of forty police officers and attacked the
peaceful marchers, seriously injuring several police officers and marchers. Id. at 7-11.
231 If the plaintiffs prove the allegations in the complaint, they should succeed on the
§ 1985(c) and § 1986 claims. All the elements of a § 1985(c) claim are present, including a
racially motivated purpose to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws by
interfering with their peaceful exercise of first amendment rights of free expression and associ-
ation. See supra notes 183-88 and accompanying text. The United States Supreme Court has
held, however, that § 1985(c) does not apply to wholly private conspiracies against first
amendment rights because they depend on the operation of the fourteenth amendment,
which is a limitation on state, not private action. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America, Local 610 v. Scott, 103 S. Ct. 3352 (1983); see also Murphy v. Mount
Carmel High School, 543 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1976); Bellamy v. Mason's Stores, 508 F.2d 504
(4th Cir. 1974); Note, Civil Rights-State Action Is a Requirement for the Application of Section
1985(3) to First Amendment Rights, 54 N.C.L. REV. 677 (1976).
Nevertheless, the § 1985(c) claim in this case is probably still sound because here the
Klansmen interfered with and injured state officers to prevent them from securing the plain-
tiffs' rights to equal protection of the laws. This is precisely the sort of private interference
with fourteenth amendment rights that Congress sought to prevent by enacting § 2 of the
1871 Civil Rights Act, the original source of§ 1985(c). See Comment, supra note 189. Compare
Scott, 103 S. Ct. at 3357 (§ 1985(c) is violated where "the aim of the conspiracy is to influence
the activity of the state").
232 See generally Increasing Violence, supra note 1, at 25 (statement of Arthur Kinoy). The
tragic occurrences described at the outset of this Comment have given rise to federal civil
litigation. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3. Waller v. Batkovich, No. 80-605G (D.N.C.
filed Nov. 3, 1980), is a civil suit arising out of the Greensboro, North Carolina killings.
Named defendants include the Klansmen and Nazis acquitted in the state criminal trial, as
well as the Department of Justice and local officials, who are accused of complicity in the
killings. See Klan Must Pay Victims, POVERTY L. REP., Mar./Apr. 1982, at 11. The women
wounded in Chattanooga, Tennessee have received a federal court jury award of $535,000 in
damages against the Klansmen who shot them but were acquitted in the state prosecution.
Crumsey v. Justice Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, No. 1-8-287 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 1, 1982); see
Klan Must Pay Victims, supra, at 9.
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rights movement but has not been used since.233 It should be employed
in the future whenever serious racial or religious violence becomes a con-
tinuing problem in local areas.
IV. CONCLUSION
Local, state, and federal governments must respond forcefully to
the rising wave of extremist group violence against minorities. While
government should protect the constitutional rights of extremist group
members, it should also move quickly to protect the lives and civil rights
of those threatened with violence because of their race or religion. The
federal civil rights acts provide adequate remedies to supplement defi-
cient state legal systems, but are inadequately enforced by the Depart-
ment of Justice and by the public. The security of the basic rights of
citizens depends on more vigorous enforcement of these federal reme-
dies, together with strong efforts to improve public awareness and edu-
cation on civil rights issues.
GREGORY L. PADGETT
233 There are only two reported cases of injunctive suits brought by the Department of
Justice to combat racial violence: United States v. Original Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 250
F. Supp. 330 (E.D. La. 1965) (three-judge court), and United States v. United States Klans,
Knights of Ku Klux Klan, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 897 (M.D. Ala. 1961).
In Original Knights, the Justice Department sued for an injunction to protect blacks in
Washington Parish, Louisiana, who were seeking to assert their civil rights under the 1964
Civil Rights Act (public accommodations and equal employment opportunity) and the 1965
Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-I (1976) (registration and voting).
Finding that the Klan relied on intimidation, economic coercion, and physical violence to
"frustrate the national policy expressed in civil rights legislation," the court enjoined the or-
ganization from assaulting, threatening, harassing, or otherwise interfering with local Negro
citizens in the exercise of their civil rights under the Civil Rights Acts. 250 F. Supp. at 334-
35.
In United States Klans, the court enjoined several Alabama Klans from interfering with
the interstate travel of civil rights workers, by harassing, threatening, or assaulting them, and
by injuring the property and workers of bus companies carrying passengers in interstate com-
merce. The court also enjoined the activities of several local officials who had assisted the
Klansmen, or who had refused to enforce local law, thereby denying equal protection. 194 F.
Supp. at 902-03.
[Vol. 75
